When combined, `个人 (gèrén)` means “individual” or “personal,” and `崇拜 (chóngbài)` means “to worship” or “adore.” Together, 个人崇拜 (gèrén chóngbài) literally translates to “personal worship,” perfectly capturing the essence of a “cult of personality.”
The term 个人崇拜 is inextricably linked to 20th-century Chinese history, specifically the rule of Mao Zedong. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), Mao's cult of personality reached its zenith. His image was everywhere, his “Little Red Book” (《毛主席语录》) was treated as a sacred text, and citizens were expected to show fanatical devotion. This period left a deep and painful scar on the nation, and as a result, the term 个人崇拜 carries an extremely heavy and negative weight. It evokes memories of political turmoil, irrationality, and the dangers of unchecked power. Comparison to a Western Concept: While “hero worship” is a similar idea, it's a weak comparison. In the West, “hero worship” (e.g., for a rock star or athlete) is typically a personal choice, often grassroots, and rarely has state power behind it. 个人崇拜, however, is almost always a top-down, state-driven phenomenon. It uses the entire apparatus of the state—schools, media, art—to construct a leader's infallible image. It is not about personal admiration; it's about political control and the eradication of dissent. A better, more direct translation is “cult of personality,” which carries the same political and historical baggage as it does in English (referring to figures like Stalin or Kim Jong-un). In modern China, any sign of a burgeoning 个人崇拜 around a leader is viewed with suspicion and alarm by many intellectuals and ordinary citizens, precisely because of the historical trauma associated with it.
Due to its sensitive and powerful nature, 个人崇拜 is used carefully.
Overall, the connotation is overwhelmingly negative. It implies a loss of critical thinking and a dangerous concentration of power.